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Abstract
It has been argued in Dawid (2013) that physicists at times gen-
erate substantial trust in an empirically unconfirmed theory based on
observations that lie beyond the theory’s intended domain. A crucial
role in the reconstruction of this argument of ”non-empirical confir-
mation” is played by limitations to scientific underdetermination. The
present paper discusses the question as to how generic the role of lim-
itations to scientific underdetermination really is. It is argued that
assessing such limitations is essential for generating trust in any the-
ory’s predictions, be it empirically confirmed or not. The emerging
view suggests that empirical and non-empirical confirmation are more
closely related to each other than one may expect at first glance.
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1 Introduction
Fundamental physics today is characterized by a scarcity of empirical data
that leaves pivotal theories without conclusive empirical testing (sometimes
without any empirical testing at all) for many decades. In order to assess
the status of those theories, physicists resort to various strategies of the-
ory assessment. In some cases like string theory or eternal inflation, those
strategies, in the understanding of many of the given theories’ exponents,
justify a fairly high degree of trust in the theory’s viability. Dawid (2006,
2013) and Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger (2015) have analyzed the question
whether arguments of non-empirical theory assessment can be epistemically
significant. It was claimed that a specific class of those arguments can be
reconstructed in a way that demonstrates their epistemic significance and,
from a Bayesian perspective, justifies calling them ”non-empirical confirma-
tion”. In conjunction and under the right circumstances those arguments
can lead to a substantial increase of the theory’s subjective probability of
being viable.
The instantiations of non-empirical confirmation presented in Dawid
(2013) share one crucial conceptual element: they are based on the assess-
ment of limitations to local scientific underdetermination. Scientific underde-
termination measures how many alternative theories that are not empirically
fully equivalent to each other can account for a given empirical data set. Lo-
cal scientific underdetermination accounts only for those theories that could
be distinguished within a given ”experimental horizon” specified by the reach
of a class of possible experiments. According to Dawid (2013), substantial
trust in a theory in the absence of empirical confirmation can be generated
based on a certain kind of meta-level observation about the research process.
Those observations support the hypothesis that only very few if any scientific
alternatives to the theory at hand exist that are empirically distinguishable
within a given empirical horizon. Non-empirical confirmation is based on
observations of that kind.
An important question that arises in this context is the following: how
generic is the role of limitations to scientific underdetermination when it
comes to significant arguments of non-empirical theory assessment? The
present paper addresses this question by focusing on the case of empirical
confirmation. It concludes that limitations to underdetermination not only
are an essential element of non-empirical theory confirmation. They play a
fundamental role in understanding empirical confirmation as well. Assess-
ments of limitations to scientific underdetermination therefore do not appear
as a whimsical way out for scientists trying to believe in their theory’s value
in the absence on empirical testing. Quite to the contrary, they constitute a
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core element of the scientific process whenever confirmation, be it empirical
or non-empirical, is involved. Empirical and non-empirical confirmation in
this light are much closer connected to each other than it would seem at first
glance.
After briefly introducing the three arguments of non-empirical theory
confirmation in Section 2, Section 3 argues for a close connection between
theory confirmation and trust in a theory’s predictions. Following an aside on
truth and viability in Section 4, Sections 5 and 6 demonstrate the importance
of scientific underdetermination for developing a satisfactory understanding
of empirical confirmation. Section 7 discusses repercussions of the presented
point of view for one line of criticism against non-empirical confirmation.
2 The Three Arguments of Non-Empirical
Theory Confirmation
Dawid (2013) proposes three main arguments of non-empirical confirmation.
NAA: The No Alternatives Argument: Scientists have looked intensely
and for a considerable time for alternatives to a known theory H that can
solve a given scientific problem but haven’t found any. This observation is
taken as an indication of the viability of theory H.
MIA: The Meta-Inductive Argument from success in the research field:
Theories in the research field that satisfy a given set of conditions have shown
a tendency of being viable in the past. This observation is taken to increase
the probability that a new theory H that also satisfies those conditions is
also viable.
UEA: The Argument of Unexpected Explanatory Interconnections: The-
ory H was developed in order to solve a specific problem. Once H was de-
veloped, physicists found that H also provides explanations with respect to
a range of problems which to solve was not the initial aim of developing the
theory. This observation is taken as an indication of the theory’s viability.
Each of the three arguments remains weak and questionable in isolation.
But the arguments gain strength and significance in conjunction. They play
an important though often contested role in generating trust in empirically
unconfirmed or insufficiently confirmed theories.
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3 The role of scientific underdetermination
One might feel content with having identified the three arguments of no-
empirical theory assessment in the physicists’ reasoning and leave it to the
specifics of the physical debate to clarify how satisfactory those arguments
are in a given context. This strategy, however, seems insufficient for an-
swering a general but important question. What is the status that can in
principle be acquired by arguments of non-empirical theory assessment? Do
they carry substantial epistemic value? And to the extent they do, how can
their epistemic value be understood within the general fabric of scientific
reasoning? In order to get a grip on this question, it seems important to
understand the arguments’ general conceptual foundations.
Analysing the issue at a basic level starts with reconsidering the general
role of evidence and confirmation in science. The canonical view on the
scientific process insists that epistemically significant support for a theory’s
viability can only be attained based on empirical evidence. On that view,
non-empirical evidence would lack epistemic significance and be confined to
the purely pragmatic role of influencing strategic decisions regarding the
selection of the theory one intends to work on in the absence of empirical
guidance.
As argued in more detail in Dawid (forthcoming), this understanding is
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it is at variance with the degree of trust
many physicists do have in empirically unconfirmed theories in the absence
of empirical confirmation. Second, it seems somewhat inconsistent to admit
that arguments of non-empirical theory assessment play a substantial and
legitimate role in a scientist’s selection of the theory she wants to work on
without conceding that this substantial role is rooted in epistemologically
significant analysis. After all, the eventual goal of a scientific theory is to
be physically viable. Considerations which do not increase the subjective
probability of a theory’s viability thus offer only limited help for making
strategic decisions. In this light, it is important to understand whether non-
empirical theory assessment can be construed in a way that reaches out
beyond the canonical understanding of epistemic significance in the scientific
process.
Dawid (2013) makes the suggestion that all three arguments can be re-
constructed in terms of arguments for limitations to local scientific under-
determination and get epistemic significance on those grounds. It is argued
that there exists a positive probabilistic correlation between each of the three
arguments and the hypothesis that only very few possible theories - or maybe
just one theory - exist that can account for the observed physical situation.
This is due to the fact that a hypothesis stating strong limitations to local
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scientific underdetermination can explain the observations spelled out in the
three arguments of non-empirical confirmation
NAA: The fact that scientists don’t find alternatives to a theory at hand
can be explained by the hypothesis that there are few or no possible alter-
natives to that theory.
MIA: The fact that theories in a research field that satisfy a given set of
conditions have high chances of predictive success can be explained by the
hypothesis that there tend to be few alternatives in the given research field
under the given conditions.
UEA: The fact that unexpected explanatory interconnections are found
can be explained by the hypothesis that the are fewer alternative theories in
the given context than there are conceptual aspects of the phenomenology
that await explanation.
A scarcity of possible theories, in turn, increases the probability that
the theory that has been found is viable. Therefore, the three arguments
on non-empirical confirmation establish a higher probability of the theory’s
viability.
Is this reconstruction of non-empirical confirmation in terms of limitations
to scientific underdetermination an arbitrary choice? The present paper aims
to demonstrate that, quite to the contrary, non-empirical confirmation is
just a particularly conspicuous case of the high importance of assessments of
limitations to scientific underdetermination in the scientific process.
I want to start the analysis with a pair of questions on empirical con-
firmation. Can confirmation of a fundamental theory by empirical data be
the basis for trusting that theory in future research contexts? And to the
extent it does, how can this connection be understood? Philosophy of science
has often been very timid in attempts to answer this question. Karl Popper
has famously claimed that science does not confirm theories but merely tests
them with the aim of refuting them. On his account, science is not in the
business at all of assessing a theory’s chances of future correct predictions.
Bayesianism1, the leading theory of confirmation today, chooses a differ-
ent perspective. Bayesians understand confirmation in terms of the increase
of a theory’s truth probability under observational evidence and emphasize
that confirmation does play a central role in scientific reasoning. However,
1for surveys of Bayesian epistemology, see e.g. Bovens and Hartmann (2003), Howson
and Urbach (2006), Strevens (2017)
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neither the precise meaning of the statement that a theory is true nor the
numerical values of truth probabilities extracted based on Bayesian updating
take center stage in Bayesian epistemology.
The main reason for this restraint lies in the philosophical difficulties
faced by the concept of truth. Scientific data analysis measures a theory’s
performance in a given experimental setting. It may aim at rejecting a null
hypothesis based on collected data or at comparing rivaling theories based
on collected data. With respect to those issues, convergence theorems tell us
that in the limit of infinitely many data points, in a large class of scientific
contexts the results of Bayesian analysis will converge towards frequentist
results. The effect of subjective priors thus can be ”overpowered” by data.
A sequence of empirical testing can establish results that are eventually en-
dorsed by the entire scientific community irrespectively of the diversity of
the scientists’ prior expectations.
What data analysis cannot do is quantify a scientific theory’s chances of
being absolutely true. Any attempt to do so would require a forecast with
respect to the theory’s performance under all possible future empirical tests.
Data analysis with respect to one empirical test offers no scientific basis for
a forecast of that kind.
The issue thus must be decided at a philosophical level within the frame-
work of the scientific realism debate, addressing issues from the pessimistic
meta induction to the question as to whether or not empirical adequacy
implies truth. Differences in priors that are due to different positions regard-
ing those philosophical questions cannot be expected to vanish with increased
data volume since the philosophical considerations involved may not be thor-
oughly testable by empirical data at all.
The stated problems for specifying absolute truth probabilities cannot be
avoided by resorting to objective Bayesianism. It is questionable whether
an objective Bayesian would want to extend the reach of objective priors all
the way to settling the scientific realism debate. Even if she assumed that
objective priors on scientific realism exist, she might refrain from asserting
that she is able to specify them at the present point. And even if she did, she
might prefer characterizing in Bayesian terms the scientists’ understanding
of a given theory’s current epistemic status without imposing on them her
own preconceptions regarding philosophically highly charged priors.
For the reasons just stated, Bayesian epistemologists, be they objective
or subjective Bayesians, refrain from discussing absolute truth probabilities
of scientific theories. The effectiveness of Bayesian confirmation theory stems
from the fact that the attribution of Bayesian confirmation is invariant under
the variation of priors (as long as dogmatic priors 1 and 0 are excluded).
The Bayesian differential definition of confirmation as a probability increase
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provides the basis for analysing a wide range of issues on confirmation without
ever specifying actual probabilities.
Still, this strategy carries far-reaching implications. Though the Bayesian
perspective implicitly suggests a correlation between theory confirmation and
the degree of trust one is ready to invest in a theory’s future performance, the
approach’s restraint regarding the absolute specification of truth probabilities
keeps it from spelling out the quantitative specifics of the former correlation
as well. The Bayesian thus offers an account of confirmation that refrains
from aswering the question how much trust a scientist should in fact have in
a specified class of predictions of a confirmed theory.
Popperian falsificationalism and canonical forms of Bayesian confirmation
theory, for all their differences, thus share one problem. They don’t account
for the fact that, for the scientist, theory confirmation is closely linked to the
question whether she can trust the confirmed theory’s new predictions.
To understand how crucial that issue becomes in actual science, let us
briefly look at an example from recent high energy physics. In Summer 2012,
the ATLAS and CMS experiments at the LHC at CERN both announced
an effect with significance above five sigma indicating the existence of a new
scalar particle that, after further detailed analysis, was firmly established as
a Higgs-like particle: a particle that in crucial respects shares the character-
istics of the Higgs field that had been posited to explain the mass spectrum
of elementary particles in the standard model.
The Higgs discovery was based on very specific kinds of signatures that
showed up in ATLAS and CMS. The implications of the existence of a Higgs
field, however, go beyond the specific role played by the Higgs field in explain-
ing the frequency of specific vertices in those two experiments at the LHC.
For example, quantum field theory predicts that a Higgs field, apart from
resulting in the generation and decay of actual particles in scattering events,
also contributes via off mass shell effects in situations where there is not suf-
ficient energy available for generating an actual Higgs particle. This process
of virtual particle exchange contributes to scattering processes and has an
effect on the predictions of scattering amplitudes. Announcing the discovery
of a particle amounts to the announcement that all physical effects of that
particle, including the described contributions of virtual particles, must be
included in all future calculations of scattering amplitudes. Doing this right
is essential for being able to make new discoveries of particles which, like in
the case of the Higgs discovery, must be based on comparing measured event
rates that may contain the new particle with the calculated background (i.e.
the expected event rate in the absence of that new particle). Only if the
calculations of the background are reliable, the search for new particles can
proceed in an effective way.
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Scientific progress in the field therefore crucially depends on the physi-
cists’ justified trust in the entire set of implications of an empirically con-
firmed theory like the Higgs theory. In sharp contrast to Popper’s ideas,
science is not only about refutation. It is also and importantly about trust-
ing well-confirmed theories. A full understanding of the scientific process
therefore hinges on understanding how scientists can develop that trust. Any
attempt to do so, however, must be based on absolute probabilities that can
characterize a theory’s status.
In order to understand the difficulties associated with finding such a prob-
abilistic construal of theory assessment in fundamental science, it is helpful
to remember that everyday reasoning avails itself of a seemingly unprob-
lematic strategy of generating trust in a somewhat similar context. Let us
consider a philosophically well known example of a hypothesis in the context
of everyday reasoning. I hear a scratching sound behind the wainscoting and
note that breadcrumbs dropped on the floor in the evening have disappeared
in the morning. I infer from this set of observations that there probably is a
mouse behind the wainscoting.
Clearly, a wide range of possible explanations of the scratching sound
exist. The more inventive I become in developing them, the more the set
of explanations to be considered will grow. It does not make much sense to
even try to keep track of all possible explanations. Nevertheless, I may feel
fairly confident that my mouse hypothesis is correct.
The reason for my confidence lies in my high degree of confidence in my
overall theory of my environment. I believe that this overall theory, while
being consistent with a wide range of explanations of the wainscoting obser-
vation, allows me to assess the probability of each of those possible explana-
tions, including the catch-all hypothesis that covers everything I could not
even think of. I have access to a long record of household events that tell me
that en-passant observations in apartments have very rarely led to fundamen-
tal new discoveries about the world. On that basis, I will attribute a very low
probability to that possibility. I am also fairly confident to have sufficient
knowledge about the known possible explanations. So I scan through the
options I can think of. I know that goblins aren’t real. I take the probability
of an extraterrestrial attack on my apartment to be negligible. I think that
the other human inhabitants of my apartment are not technically sufficiently
versed to play a trick on me by generating a genuinely mouse-like sound be-
hind the wainscoting. But the mouse possibility is very plausible and I had
mice in the apartment before. Based on all of these complex steps of analysis
which are grounded in my overall theory about the world and my neighbor-
hood, a probabilistic analysis leads me to endorse the mouse hypothesis with
considerable confidence.
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The described line of reasoning is a typical example of inference to the best
explanation in an everyday context. It is based on carrying out an exhaustive
probabilistic assessment of all explanations that seem possible based on my
well established and well tested world view. Being philosophically informed,
I’m aware of the fact that the problem of induction lurks somewhere in the
background. But it seems of limited practical relevance.
Unfortunately, the scheme just presented only works as long as reasoning
happens within the safe confines of the well known world. It is an essential
precondition for the success of my wainscoting analysis that I can attribute
a low probability to the possibility that the core principles of my theory
about the world are inconsistent with the true explanation and have to be
modified to account for my observation. This may be taken for granted in
most everyday life situations. But it cannot be assumed in fundamental
science.
In fundamental science, one is typically confronted with data that indeed
is at variance with our well established fundamental theory. Scientists search
for a new theory that can account for the new data. The question that corre-
sponds to the earlier question as to how much confidence I could have in the
mouse hypothesis without having seen the mouse now becomes: how much
trust can scientists have in the future predictive success of a hypothesis that
was developed in order to account for a given set of anomalous data? The
kinds of reasoning that led to a probabilistic appraisal of possible explana-
tions in the wainscoting example is of little use here. Since the observations
to be accounted for are known to be in conflict with our well-established
theories, it makes no sense to assess the probability of a suggested new the-
ory within the old theoretical framework. If scientists find a novel theory Ta
in fundamental science that accounts for some anomalous data E1, consid-
erations on the trust one may have in Ta and its so far untested empirical
predictions thus boil down to assessing precisely the one aspect of the wain-
scoting analysis that had been considered safe to disregard in that context:
we need to assess the probability that the data E2 to be collected at the
next step of empirical testing will be consistent with a different fundamental
theory Tb rather than with Ta.
I have argued above that scientists do generate such trust and must rely
on it in order to do meaningful science. I have also argued that canonical
theories on theory testing and confirmation don’t offer good reasons for this
trust. So how could we find such good reasons? The answer will lead back
to limitations to scientific underdetermination. Section 5 will make the case
that the mechanism that generates trust in the predictions of empirically
confirmed theories is of exactly the same type as the mechanism that can
support non-empirical confirmation in the absence of empirical confirmation.
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4 What Scientists mean when they endorse
a Theory
As pointed out above, physics relies on an implicit quantitative assessment
of the degree of trust one should have in a theory. But the trust physicists
are aiming at has little to do with the issue of a theory’s truth. When
they endorse a theory, their endorsement is perfectly consistent with their
expectation that the theory has a limited range of applicability and will have
to be superseeded by a more fundamental theory once one aims at describing
a wider range of empirical data. To give one example, endorsing the standard
model of particle physics as an adequate description of physics up to he
electroweak scale does not imply the rejection of theories positing new physics
at higher energy scales. Those more fundamental theories may well be based
on a substantially different ontology than the standard model and therefore
be at variance with the truth or even, in an ontological sense, approximate
truth of the latter. The standard model’s endorsement by physicists thus
remains entirely independent from philosophical considerations about the
theory’s truth.
Truth in this light does not appear to be a helpful concept for under-
standing theory assessment by scientists. I suggest that the most effective
way of representing the scientist’s perspective on theory confirmation con-
sists in understanding theory assessment and confirmation in terms of what
I call a theory’s viability rather than its truth. The idea is
1: to rely on a Bayesian approach in order to account for the probabilistic
nature of theory assessment.
2: to reject truth as the object of probabilistic analysis in this context.
3: to introduce the concept of empirical viability within a given empirical
context as the basis of probabilistic analysis. This step allows to link
scientific confirmation to the ascription of absolute probabilities.
On this account, confirmation is understood as an observation-based in-
crease of the probability that the confirmed theory is viable within a given
empirical horizon. An example of specifying an empirical horizon in the con-
text of high energy physics would be specifying an energy scale up to which
a theory is tested. Viability is then defined as the agreement of the theory’s
predictions with all empirical data that can be possibly collected within that
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empirical horizon. The probability of a theory’s viability therefore can be
specified only with respect to a spelled out empirical horizon. Henceforth,
we will write
P (T ) (1)
as the probability that theory H is viable. Strictly speaking, T should
carry an index denoting the chosen empirical horizon. We will omit that
index for the sake of simplicity.
The claim that the three lines of reasoning presented in Section 2 can
in conjunction amount to significant confirmation can now be understood in
this framework: the three arguments can substantially increase the subjective
probability that a theory be viable within a given empirical horizon.
5 A spectrum of Choices
Scientific theories make predictions about observable phenomena. Empirical
data that can be in agreement or at variance with a theory’s predictions
are said to be within the theory’s intended domain. Bayesian confirmation
is canonically understood to rely on empirical data within a given theory’s
intended domain. The idea that observations that lie beyond a theory’s
intended domain can amount to Bayesian confirmation has not been consid-
ered in canonical Bayesian epistemology for two reasons. First, as will be
discussed in a little more detail later on, the focus on comparing a theory’s
predictions with empirical data offers the most straightforward way of delim-
iting the scientific method from other modes of reasoning. Second, the direct
argument for an increase of a theory’s probability due to an observation is
not applicable to observations that lie beyond the theory’s intended domain.
For data E that lies within the intended domain of theory H, P (E|T )
can be extracted from H itself. Bayes’ formula
P (T |E)
P (T )
=
P (E|T )
P (E)
(2)
implies that data E confirms H if P (E|T ) > P (E). A moderate value for
P (E) indicates the a priori understanding that the viable theory describing
the given physical context might well be one that does not predict E. A
value of P (E|T ) that lies substantially above what seems a plausible value
of P (E) then amounts to substantial confirmation.
With respect to observations F that lie outside the theory’s intended
domain, P (F |T ) cannot be extracted from the theory H itself. Therefore, no
immediate line of reasoning leads from the theory’s empirical implications
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towards establishing confirmation. This does not rule out, however, that
non-empirical evidence F may have confirmation value with respect to H.
The most straightforward way of constructing a scenario where this is the
case is to retain the mechanism of confirmation based on a prediction at a
meta-level. The data F is then taken to be predicted by some meta-level
hypothesis Y . In other words, while F lies outside the intended domain of
theory H, it lies within the intended domain of the meta-level hypothesis Y .
The crucial question then becomes whether there is a positive probabilistic
correlation between the truth of Y and the viability of H. If that is the case,
F confirms H via confirming Y .
As described in Section 3, limitations to scientific underdetermination can
step in at this point. The hypothesis Y that can be used most effectively
for establishing a confirmation value of all three arguments of non-empirical
confirmation is a hypothesis on strong limitations to scientific underdetermi-
nation. In the following, I want to argue for the cogency of this suggestion
within a Bayesian framework by embedding it in the general view on con-
firmation developed above. It will turn out that, from that perspective, the
significance of limitations to scientific underdetermination can be understood
without thinking about non-empirical confirmation at all.
P (E) in (2) can be written as a total probability
P (E) = Σni=1P (Ti)P (E|Ti) + P (CA)P (E|CA) (3)
for n known theories Hi, Ti being the statement that theory Hi is viable.
CA denotes the catchall hypothesis that an unconceived alternative theory
rather than any of the known alternatives is viable. (Remember that we have
specified theory individuation based on distinguishable predictions within a
given empirical horizon.) Let us consider the case where one known theory
H correctly reproduces a set of data E1. No alternatives to H are known
that reproduce E1. The question is how much trust scientists should have
in further predictions of H within an empirical horizon E2 . CA covers all
unconceived alternatives that correctly represent E1. Trust in the scientific
process suggests to attribute a very low probability to the possibility that
the viable theory in the given context is a theory that violates core principles
of scientificality. This includes disregard for theories that are manifestly
inconsistent in a way that prevents a cogent set of physical implications, for
theories that are predictively empty, for theories that fail in a substantial
way to reproduce the predictive power of empirically well confirmed theories
that are understood to work as the new theory’s effective theory and probably
some other categories of deeply unsatisfactory theories. Therefore, we expect
that
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P (CA) ' Σmj=1P (Tj)P (E|Tj) (4)
summing over the m unconceived alternatives that satisfy core conditions
of scientificality. In the absence of further knowledge about the character-
istics of those unconceived scientific alternatives, it seems very plausible to
make two general assumptions.
A: each of the unconceived alternatives has roughly the same prior prob-
ability of being viable.
B: an unconceived alternative has roughly the same prior probability of
being viable as the known candidate theory H.
Both assumptions can be motivated by considering theory assessment
with respect to known alternatives. Assumption A looks plausible in light
of the way a spectrum of known alternatives is understood to affect the
prospects of an individual theory. If a spectrum of known alternatives is
known to account for the data, scientists are ready to attribute roughly
equal probabilities to the viability of each of them as long as they have no
strong reason to favor or disfavor any of them. This indeed leads to a direct
dependence of the trust they are willing to invest into an individual theory
on the number possible alternatives they are aware of. For example, the
vast number of models of supersymmetric theories, despite the fact that they
differ in simplicity and with respect to their conceptual merits, implies that
no individual model is taken to be trustworthy, even under the assumption
that low energy supersymmetry applies at all. The fact that considerations
along those lines are used with respect to a spectrum of known theories where
differences with regard to the individual theories’ merits can be spelled out
makes it even more plausible to deploy this kind of consideration in the case
of unconceived alternatives where no such differences can be specified.
Assumption B can be argued for based on the way a newly developed al-
ternative theory is treated. If a new theory with comparable scientific merits
is developed as a possible alternative to a long known theory, the new theory
is taken to have prospects of being viable that are comparable to those of the
earlier theory. The fact that the new theory had not been discovered earlier
is not taken to be a significant argument against that theory’s viability. For
example, when large extra dimensions plus brane physics were understood to
provide an alternative scenario for understanding the grand unification scale,
that scenario was considered a serious alternative with significant prospects
of viability irrespectively of the time line of theory development. Given that
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the merits of unconceived alternatives in comparison with the known the-
ory’s scientific merits cannot be specified, it seems natural in this light to
assume prior probabilities of an unconceived alternative’s viability that are
comparable to those attributed to the known theory.
In conjunction, assumptions A and B amount to the understanding that
the theory that has been developed can roughly be viewed as a random pick
out of the ensemble of possible alternatives. It is assumed that scientists
don’t own a truth detector that guides them towards discovering the viable
theory first. The described view implies that the prior probability attributed
to the catch all hypothesis is directly linked to the assessment as to how
many unconceived alternatives to a given empirically confirmed theory exist
that predict the confirming data as well. As long as that number is taken to
be large, the catch-all hypothesis dominates the probability assessment and
reduces the probability of the known theory’s viability within the empirical
horizon E to very small values. There is no basis for trusting the predictions
of theory H. Strict limitations to scientific underdetermination are therefore
necessary for having trust in a theory’s empirical predictions.
6 The Wider Picture
Let us put the above Bayesian analysis of the connection between theory con-
firmation and trust in a theory’s predictions into the wider context discussed
in Section 3.
The plausibility of extending the concept of confirmation to include obser-
vations beyond the confirmed theory’s intended domain has been overlooked
or under-appreciated in the philosophy of science up to this point due to two
deeply entrenched ways of thinking about the scientific process.
i: Since confirmation has traditionally been linked to truth, the philo-
sophical problems related to the concept of truth have led to a decoupling of
the analysis of confirmation from the issue of extracting absolute probabili-
ties of a theory’s viability in a given empirical context. This has resulted in
a split between the issue of confirmation and the question as to how scien-
tists can actually justify their trust in further predictions of an empirically
confirmed theory.
ii: The distinction between scientific and non-scientific reasoning has
largely been built on the testability of scientific theories by empirical data
within the theory’s intended domain. Scientific theory confirmation, to the
extent it has been acknowledged as a core element of scientific reasoning, has
mainly been understood as the process that implements empirical testing
as a cornerstone of scientific reasoning. Therefore it has been taken to be
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based, virtually by definition, on empirical data within the theory’s intended
domain.
However, divorcing the notion of confirmation from the notion of speci-
fying actual trust in a theory’s predictions leaves out an essential element of
the role played by confirmation in science: the importance of confirmation
to the scientist rests to a considerable degree on the trust it licenses in a
theory’s predictions. This implies that an adequate analysis of the role of
confirmation in science needs to address the argumentative mechanisms that
lead from confirming empirical data to trust in a theory’s predictions.
Once the issue of trust in a theory’s predictions has been clearly separated
from the issue of truth, it becomes clear that the former hinges on the the
understanding that local scientific underdetermination is very limited. But
limitations to local scientific underdetermination cannot be inferred from
data within the theory’s intended domain. They need to be inferred based
on arguments of non-empirical theory assessment.
Empirical confirmation thus emerges as a compound of two levels of anal-
ysis. Confrontation of a theory’s predictions with empirical data establishes
that a theory is empirically confirmed. On that basis, non-empirical theory
assessment establishes claims of limitations to scientific underdetermination
that determine the confirmation value of the confirming data in terms of the
degree to which it licenses trust in the theory’s further empirical predictions.
The strength of limitations to scientific underdetermination crucially depends
on the strength of the confirming data: the more striking the agreement be-
tween the collected data and a theory’s predictions, the fewer alternative
theories may be expected to match that predictive success. However, even
the strongest agreement of a theory’s predictions with collected data does
not license trust in the theory’s further predictions in the absence of an as-
sessment of limitations to scientific underdetermination.
Empirical testing remains the cornerstone of confirmation. Empirical vi-
ability is defined via empirical testing and empirical testing someplace else in
the research field constitutes one crucial element of non-empirical theory as-
sessment (MIA). In one respect, however, the presented view actually inverts
the hierarchy between empirical testing and non-empirical theory assessment.
Non-empirical theory assessment of the theory under scrutiny emerges as the
only irreplaceable element of analysis that is necessary for generating signifi-
cant trust in that theory’s predictions. In the absence of arguments indicating
that scientific underdetermination is limited in the given context, even the
strongest agreement between theory and data would not lead to trust in the
theory’s further predictions. The probability of the theory’s viability would
not get significantly increased.
The agreement between collected data and a theory’s quantitative core
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predictions offers the by far most powerful basis for extracting claims of
limitations to scientific underdetermination. But it is not the only kind of
information that can provide a basis for considerations on limitations to
scientific underdetermination. Limitations to scientific underdetermination
may also be considered with respect to general characteristics of the collected
data that stand in a highly indirect relation to the core characteristics of the
theory that has been developed to explain them. The Higgs mechanism
has long been suspected to be the only scientific conceptual scheme that
could explain the mass spectrum of elementary particles while retaining the
explanatory power of gauge theory in the given context. This conjecture
of strong limitations to scientific underdetermination was put forward long
before empirical signatures of Higgs particles had been found. String theory
is taken by many of its exponents to be the only scientific theory that can
explain the observed structure of nuclear interactions that can be represented
by a gauge theory plus the existence of a gravitational force. This claim of
strong limitations to scientific underdetermination is made in the absence of
any empirical data that can be understood as the signature of a string.
In cases like these, trust in the theory’s predictions is generated already
at a stage where none of the theory’s predictions has been tested - or even
quantitatively spelled out. Non-empirical theory assessment is then deployed
as actual non-empirical theory confirmation. In our world, non-empirical
confirmation will never reach the levels of conclusiveness of strong empirical
confirmation. But the difference between the two kinds of confirmation is
gradual. Non-empirical theory assessment plays a crucial role in both of
them and reveals a strong continuity between empirical and non-empirical
confirmation.
7 The reliability of non-empirical theory as-
sessment
The above reasoning offers a fresh perspective on one important line of criti-
cism that has been put forward against non-empirical confirmation. Crucial
elements of the assessment of limitations to scientific underdetermination,
such as the specification of scientificality criteria that have to be fulfilled
by a scientific alternative or the specifics of theory individuation are kept
fairly vague. Dardashti (forthcoming) and Oriti (forthcoming) have argued
that these vaguenesses render statements of non-empirical confirmation un-
derspecified and therefore threaten their significance.
The present text is not concerned with the structural analysis of this issue.
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However, the analysis presented in the previous sections can put the status of
the described worry into a wider perspective. We have seen that assessments
of limitations to scientific underdetermination are of crucial importance for
building up trust in an empirically confirmed theory’s further predictions.
An adequate representation of the way scientists understand the significance
of empirical confirmation must therefore acknowledge assessments of limita-
tions to scientific underdetermination as an integral element of the process of
theory confirmation. The very same vaguenesses, however, that characterize
arguments for limitations to scientific underdetermination in the context of
non-empirical confirmation also arise when those arguments are deployed for
understanding the predictive reliability of an empirically confirmed theory.
One might bite the bullet and argue that empirical confirmation in the
wider sense I suggest fails to be a workable concept as well. This step, how-
ever, would lead back to the unsatisfactory situation described in Section 3.
It would ignore the fact that scientists do link confirmation to appraisals of
the trustworthiness of a theory’s predictions. And, even more significantly,
it would ignore the fact that scientists have a very high degree of trust in
further predictions of empirically well confirmed theories (remember the ex-
ample of the strong reliance on contributions of newly discovered particles to
the calculation of the background for scattering amplitudes in high energy
physics).
The very stable role of empirically well confirmed theories in the research
process demonstrates that the vagueness of some elements of non-empirical
theory assessment does not per se rule out very high posteriors for a theory’s
viability. This does not mean that the described vaguenesses are concep-
tually unproblematic. It indicates, however, that the problems that arise
when aiming at a precise understanding of statements of limitations to scien-
tific underdetermination should not be taken as an argument against those
statements’ epistemic relevance. A careful conceptual analysis of those vague-
nesses is just as important for understanding empirical confirmation as it is
for understanding non-empirical confirmation.
8 Conclusion
Theory confirmation may be approached in two different ways. One may
either understand confirmation formally in terms of an increase of a theory’s
truth probability. Or one may understand confirmation in terms of the actual
degree of trust generated with respect to a theory’s predictions. The first
view has the advantage of avoiding the tricky issue how to translate outcomes
of past experiments into prospects for the outcome of new ones. The second
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view, on the other hand, has the merit of addressing the main reason why
confirmation is of crucial importance in science.
If the second view on confirmation is chosen, it seems difficult to avoid the
conclusion that assessments of limitations to local scientific underdetermina-
tion play an important role in specifying the confirmation value of confirming
data. Empirical confirmation then relies both on the confirming data and
on non-empirical theory assessment that establishes claims of limitations to
local scientific underdetermination. Only in conjunction, the two elements of
empirical confirmation can generate substantial trust in the theory’s further
predictions.
Once this has been acknowledged, it is a small step towards conceding
that confirmation may also be realized in the absence of empirical testing of a
theory if other considerations provide a framework for inferring limitations to
scientific underdetermination. Non-empirical and empirical confirmation in
this light are conceptually related via the concept of limitations to scientific
underdetermination.
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